Protestants, peace and the apocalypse: The USSR's religious cold war, 1947-62 by Dobson, M.
This is a repository copy of Protestants, peace and the apocalypse: The USSR's religious 
cold war, 1947-62.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/131817/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Dobson, M. (2018) Protestants, peace and the apocalypse: The USSR's religious cold war,
1947-62. Journal of Contemporary History, 53 (2). pp. 361-390. ISSN 0022-0094 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009417719997
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits 
any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the 
original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages 
(https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Article
Protestants, Peace
and the Apocalypse:
The USSR’s Religious
Cold War, 1947–62
Miriam Dobson
University of Sheffield, UK
Abstract
In recent years historians have paid growing attention to the religious dimensions of the
Cold War. These studies have largely focused, however, on the capitalist world, par-
ticularly the rise of evangelicalism and fundamentalism in the USA. This article turns the
spotlight on the communist adversary, asking whether the USSR also participated in a
‘religious Cold War’. Given the atheist convictions on which the Soviet state was
founded, this might appear counter-intuitive, but religious dynamics were of growing
importance in the USSR too. Soviet officials sought to create what was called an
‘ecumenical movement’, inviting religious actors to become advocates for the Soviet
peace message. Protestants, in particular, were important figures on the international
stage because of the large communities of co-believers in the West. At the same time,
however, the authorities were alarmed about various grass-roots phenomena at home
which seemed to be on the rise as the Cold War escalated, such as pacifism and
apocalyptic prediction. Faced with such threats, state tactics included the arrest of
believers and hostile press campaigns. Even though the inconsistencies were readily
visible to all, this dualistic approach was not abandoned and the ultimately self-defeating
engagement with the ‘religious Cold War’ continued.
Keywords
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In 1958, a Ukrainian Baptist in his forties named Fedor Krylov found himself in
court for writing and disseminating what were deemed anti-Soviet sermons and
texts. In addition to preaching slanderous messages to congregations in several
diﬀerent cities, he was found to have sent his works to Peter Deyneka,
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the missionary leader of the Slavic Gospel Association in Chicago, asking for them
to be read aloud on radio programs broadcast on Soviet airwaves. His trial pro-
ceedings centred on the content of the texts such as the ‘Appeal to Atheists’ in
which Krylov argued that the ‘recklessness’ of both political systems risked uni-
versal destruction. In it, he addressed the world’s politicians directly:
Leaders of nations! Decide your own fate today. If you now turn away from the world
God oﬀers you, you must lie in the bed you’ve made. You who kindle the ﬂames of
war, armed with arrows of ﬁre, go walk into your own ﬁre and among the sparks you
have set ablaze. This is your fate at my hands: you shall lie down in
torment . . . Showing no restraint in front of the people you threaten one another
with atomic and hydrogen bombs, but on whose heads do you want to drop them,
on yours or ours? It is not enough that you have sentenced hundreds of millions of
people to eternal agony by turning them against God, but you, ignoring article 124 of
the USSR Constitution, are also hurting the true people of God.1
Here Krylov articulated political messages he wanted his imagined audience, both
in the USA and at home in the USSR, to hear. He criticized the Soviet government
for failing to adhere to its own promises, as laid out in article 124 of the 1936
Constitution which promised ‘freedom of religious worship’.2 But his text is not a
straight-forward critique of the Soviet leaders and their unconstitutional mode of
governance.3 In fact his ﬁrst, and perhaps most powerful, point concerns world
leaders, particularly those responsible for the escalating Cold War. The author
draws explicitly on the Bible, interweaving an unattributed verse from Isaiah
(From ‘You who kindle’ to ‘lie down in torment’) into his own text to give a
clear lesson: those who deny God, who continue to incite war, and who hurt the
righteous will be punished, their own violence turned against them.4 The Isaiah
verse was used not only to prophesy retribution against the atheist state, but also to
1 Fedor Krylov, born in 1912 in a village in Poltava region (Ukraine), received only three years of
schooling, and by the age of 20 his Baptist faith had landed him in prison for the first time, sentenced in
1932 by a GPU troika to three years, and in 1937 to a further 10 years by a NKVD troika. Between his
release in 1947 and his third arrest in 1958, he lived with his wife in the Krasnodar region and supported
eight children by working as a cobbler. In August 1958, he was sentenced under article 58 to 10 years in
corrective-labour camps. In 1966 his sentence was reduced to eight years and he was released but not
rehabilitated (although the 1937 conviction had been overturned). Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskii
federatsii (GARF) f. 8131, op. 31, d. 89745 (especially l. 20). This case, and others based on individual
court files, has been anonymized by assigning the protagonist a pseudonym.
2 1936 Constitution of the USSR. Available at: http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/cnst1936.htm
(accessed 8 November 2017).
3 In this respect, it was quite different from the texts composed by members of the dissident movement
that was to emerge over the coming years. As Benjamin Nathans has shown, one key tactic deployed by
dissidents was to call upon the state to obey its own laws. See B. Nathans, ‘The Dictatorship of Reason:
Aleksandr Vol’pin and the Idea of Rights under ‘‘Developed Socialism’’’, Slavic Review, 66, 4 (Winter
2007), 630–63.
4 Isaiah, 50, 11: ‘But you who kindle a fire and set fire-brands alight, go, walk into your own fire and
among the fire-brands you have set ablaze. This is your fate at my hands: you shall lie down in torment’.
For commentary on this verse, see C. Westermann, Isaiah 40-66: A Commentary (Philadelphia, PA
1969), 235.
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evoke scenes of blazing ﬁre. The Soviet oﬃcials dealing with his case took this to
mean Krylov believed atomic weapons threatened all peoples with a terrible exter-
mination.5 During the investigation, he apparently claimed that if believers served
in the army they would ‘burn for all eternity in a lake of ﬁre’, further evidence for
his interrogators of his subversive, scripture-based paciﬁsm.6
Krylov’s case raises important questions about Cold War mentalities in the
Soviet Union. How far were Soviet people aware of the new threat posed by
nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s? Did the advent of atomic weaponry
shape their outlook on the contemporary world and on the future? Did the Cold
War encourage paciﬁst sentiment (as with Krylov), or did it inspire robust patri-
otism, as the state hoped? And what role, if any, did religion play in all of this?
Religion has often been considered a potential source of resistance to the commun-
ist regime, particularly for the early and late Soviet eras.7 Without adopting the
notion of resistance per se, this article contributes to the existing literature by
showing how the threat of a new kind of global conﬂict, whose scale and character
were unknown, made scripture appealing for those seeking to ease their fears about
the future. The article also explores how, in the context of the Cold War, the Soviet
state responded in new and quite ambivalent ways.
The issues under consideration here have been explored very fully in the existing
scholarship on the USSR’s nemesis: the USA. From August 1945, soon after Enola
Gay dropped its load on Hiroshima, the media bombarded readers with images of
the terrifying mushroom cloud, alongside poetry, jokes, and cartoons on the
atomic theme; science ﬁction ‘accounts of a nuclear holocaust wiping out the
entire population’ proliferated, with scenes of devastation far outstripping
the destruction of which nuclear technology was yet capable.8 Although this
5 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 89745, l. 17.
6 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 89745, l. 19.
7 On various forms of resistance from within the Russian Orthodox tradition see for example: W.B.
Husband, ‘Soviet Atheism and Russian Orthodox Strategies of Resistance, 1917–1932’, Journal of
Modern History, 70, 1 (March 1998), 74–107; A. Beglov, V poiskakh ‘bezgrezhnykh katakomb’: tserkov-
noe podpol’e v SSSR (Moscow 2008); M.V. Shkarovskii, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church versus the
State: The Josephite Movement, 1927–1940’, Slavic Review, 54, 2 (Summer 1995), 365–84. In the late
Soviet period, contemporary observers often saw in church life opposition to the regime developing. See,
for example: M. Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia: Protestant Opposition to Soviet Religious
Policy (London and New York, NY 1968); Risen Indeed: Lessons in Faith from the USSR (London
1983); W.C. Fletcher, Soviet Charismatics: the Pentecostals in the USSR (New York, NY 1985). Jane
Ellis’ 1986 study of the Russian Orthodox Church pays significant attention to its role in the emergence
of dissent from the 1970s on: J. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History (London
1986). More recently, Emily Baran argues that in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses at least, the concept of
resistance is useful: ‘Witnesses’ activity illustrates the power of religion to motivate believers to resist,
even if believers did not see it in these terms’. E. Baran, Dissent on the Margins: How Soviet Jehovah’s
Witnesses defied Communism and Lived to Preach about it (New York, NY 2014), 7.
8 T. Garvey, ‘La´szlo´ Moholy-Nagy and Atomic Ambivalence in Post-War Chicago’, American Art, 14
(Fall 2000), 22–39 (36–7). Paul Boyer identifies the 20 August 1945 edition of Life as the moment when
many Americans first encountered images of the mushroom cloud. P.S. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early
Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill, NC 1994), 8. On the
emerging nuclear culture, see also: S. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA 1988);
A.M. Winkler, Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom (Urbana, IL 1999).
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climate of fear and conjecture ebbed and ﬂowed over the coming years, what Paul
Boyer has called a ‘nuclear consciousness’ established itself as a key feature of the
late 1940s and 1950s.9 Over these years the country also experienced a major religious
revival, with evangelicalism and fundamentalism gaining signiﬁcant ground, phenom-
ena which many historians attribute, at least partially, to the Cold War’s impact.
Stephen Whitﬁeld suggests that the popularity of evangelist Billy Graham’s invoca-
tion of Armageddon (as well as his promise of redemption) was possible only in the
atmosphere of ‘dread and anxiety’ generated by the new conﬂict.10 For pre-millenni-
alists, nuclear war, or its threat, was evidence that the great tribulation was imminent;
this kind of conjecture about the End Times – once the preserve of a minority – now
took root in mainstream culture.11 These cultural and spiritual shifts were encouraged
by the country’s political leaders, even if the latter did not always endorse the more
apocalyptic visions.12 On the international stage, Harry S. Truman sought to build an
ecumenical alliance that would unite the democratic world against the godless com-
munists. In 1948, the World Council of Churches – the interwar innovation of
European and American Protestants horriﬁed by the violence of the First World
War and the rise of fascism – formally came into existence and, according to
Dianne Kirby, Truman sought to incorporate it into his ‘religious anti-communist
front’.13 Kirby writes that the Cold War came to be perceived as ‘one of history’s
great religious wars’ because of the way western propaganda exploited ‘the crusade
concept, transforming containment into a morality play in which western civilization
and Christianity were defended from the encroaches of a godless communism’.14
9 Boyer, By the Bomb’s, xviii. More recent work cautions against overstressing the impact of the Cold
War. See P. Kuznick and J. Gilbert (eds), Rethinking Cold War Culture (Washington, DC 2001).
10 S.J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, MD 1996), 77–82 (78). Paul Boyer notes
that in 1950 Graham seemed to indicate that the end was coming within two years. See P. Boyer, ‘The
Growth of Fundamentalist Apocalyptic in the United States’, in B. McGinn, J.J. Collins and S.J. Stein
(eds), The Continuum History of Apocalypticism (New York, NY 2003), 516–44 (534). For an explor-
ation of how Jehovah’s Witnesses used the Book of Daniel to explain the Cold War, see Z. Knox, ‘The
Watch Tower Society and the End of the Cold War: Interpretations of the End-Times, Superpower
Conflict, and the Changing Geo-Political Order’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 79, 4
(December 2011), 1018–49.
11 Boyer, ‘The Growth of Fundamentalist Apocalyptic’; A.M. Lahr, Millennial Dreams and
Apocalyptic Nightmares: The Cold War Origins of Political Evangelism (Oxford 2007). On Catholics,
see T.A. Kselman and S. Avella, ‘Marian Piety and the Cold War in the United States’, The Catholic
Historical Review, 72, 3 (July 1986), 403–24.
12 William Inboden suggests that at least at times, Harry Truman’s perspective was predominantly
post-millennial, for example. W. Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960: The Soul
of Containment (Cambridge 2008), 111.
13 D. Kirby, ‘Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold War’
in Kirby (ed.), Religion and the Cold War (Basingstoke 2003), 77–102 (94); see also D. Kirby, ‘From
Bridge to Divide: East–West Relations and Christianity during the Second World War and Early Cold
War’, International History Review, 36, 4 (2014), 721–44; Canon J. Nurser, ‘The ‘‘Ecumenical
Movement’’ Churches, ‘‘Global Order,’’ and Human Rights: 1938–1948’, Human Rights Quarterly,
25, 4 (November 2003), 841–81; J. Gorry, Cold War Christians and the Spectre of Nuclear Deterrence,
1945–1959 (Basingstoke 2013); J.P. Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s Religious
Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War (New York, NY and Oxford, 2011).
14 D. Kirby, ‘Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the Defence of Western
Civilization and Christianity, 1945–48’, Journal of Contemporary History 35, 3 (July 2000), 385–412.
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Whilst there was certainly opposition to this use of their faith to bolster a militaristic
agenda from a small Christian paciﬁst movement, and many presidential initiatives
encountered opposition from church leaders, religion, very broadly deﬁned, had
undeniable potential for uniting the nation in opposition to its communist enemy
and for giving meaning to fears about the destruction atomic technologies could
unleash.15 In his history of religion and foreign relations in the USA, Andrew
Preston suggests we adopt the concept of a ‘religious Cold War’ to complement
the now widely used notion of a ‘cultural Cold War’.16
In comparison with this rich scholarship on the USA, the literature on
Soviet Cold War culture is rather less extensive. Indeed, as the musicologist
Peter Schmelz has noted, it was once assumed that there was no ‘Cold War culture’
in the USSR.17 Over the last decade or so, several key studies have certainly
challenged this perception covering topics that include, among others, cinema,
music, childhood, domestic life and nuclear plants, some of them making explicit
comparisons with the USA.18 Yet it is also the case that in the cultural and media
forms sanctioned by the Soviet authorities, there were key silences and omissions.
The iconic images of exploding bombs found in the West were absent from
the pages of the Soviet press and the state actively discouraged reﬂection on
the scale of devastation a nuclear conﬂict might bring.19 The Soviet media oﬀered
its own binary version of the conﬂict, but it was a sketchy one with little real
explanation of what the atomic, and hydrogen, bomb meant in practice.20
Instead, from the late 1940s, the press gave endless coverage to an international,
communist-led, peace movement initially known as the Partisans of Peace and then
15 On the Peacemaker movement, see L. Danielson, ‘‘‘It Is a Day of Judgment’’: The Peacemakers,
Religion, and Radicalism in Cold War America’, Religion and American Culture: A Journal of
Interpretation, 18, 2 (Summer 2008), 215–48. On the opposition of some Protestant leaders to certain
presidential initiatives, see chapter 2, Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy.
16 A. Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New
York, NY 2012), 417.
17 Schmelz cites anthropologist, Nancy Ries, who wrote in 1997: ‘The kind of consciousness of the
nuclear arms race that from 1945 on inspired Western war fantasies and peace movements, and their
thousands of cultural productions, had hardly taken place in Russia’. P. Schmelz, ‘Alfred Schnittke’s
Nagasaki: Soviet Nuclear Culture, Radio Moscow, and the Global Cold War’, Journal of the American
Musicological Society, 62, 2 (Summer, 2009), 413–74 (413–14); N. Ries, Russian Talk: Culture and
Conversation during Perestroika (Ithaca, NY 1997), 7.
18 A. Shcherbenok ‘Asymmetric Warfare: The Vision of the Enemy in American and Soviet Cold
War Cinemas’, KinoKultura, 28 (2010); Schmelz, ‘Alfred Schnittke’s Nagasaki’; M.E. Peacock,
Innocent Weapons: The Soviet and American Politics of Childhood in the Cold War (Chapel Hill,
NC 2014); S. Reid, ‘Cold War in the kitchen: Gender and the de-Stalinization of consumer taste
in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev’, Slavic Review, 61, 2 (Summer 2002), 211–52; S. Reid, ‘‘‘Who
Will Beat Whom?’’ Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959’,
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 9, 4 (2008), 855–904; K. Brown, Plutopia:
Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford
2013).
19 On this, see M. Dobson, ‘Building Peace, Fearing the Apocalypse? Nuclear Danger in Soviet Cold-
War Culture’, in M. Grant and B. Ziemann (eds), Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought
and Nuclear Conflict, 1945–90 (Manchester 2016), 51–74.
20 See, for example, Krokodil front covers on 30 April 1952, 30 November 1952, and 20 December
1952.
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in 1950 renamed the World Peace Council, ‘initiated and lavishly funded by the
Kremlin’.21 The core message was that ‘peace’ was pursued by the Soviet Union,
responsibility for the arms race lying squarely with the West. The WPC recruited a
range of public luminaries from the communist bloc as well as fellow-travellers in the
West, holding almost annual international congresses that were awarded endless pages
of reportage in Pravda and Izvestiia, peaking in 1950 with the issuing of the Stockholm
Peace Appeal demanding ‘the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon’.22
Soviet citizens were not to be passive bystanders in all of this, but were instead
expected to support the campaign by attending meetings or signing petitions.23 The
regime thus wanted its citizens to be alert to, and concerned about, the international
crisis, but it denounced fear as an emotion unworthy of Soviet people and gave the
public little sense of how nuclear weapons actually changed the nature of warfare.24
Although Stalin’s successors proved more willing to acknowledge the danger posed by
the advent of atomic weaponry, cultural representations of nuclear war remained
largely taboo until almost the very end of the Soviet period. In this context, anxiety
did not dissolve but found alternative, illicit modes of expression.
In this article, I begin by oﬀering a vision of Soviet society in the late 1940s and
1950s that has much in common with Timothy Johnston’s recent social history.
His examination of the USSR in the war and its immediate aftermath suggests a
community abuzz with hearsay, a society in which rumours rivalled the state media
as people’s main source of information. He also suggests that whilst the peace cam-
paigns were highly eﬀective in galvanizing society, individuals often articulated a subtly
diﬀerent conception of peace, expressing views that were essentially paciﬁst, and failing
to adopt the oﬃcial logic, whereby war might in fact be essential for securing the peace
of the future.25 This article also includes examination of anti-war sentiment of certain
groups within society, but departs from Johnston’s portrayal of Soviet life in one key
way. According to Johnston’s picture, the vibrant oral culture of the postwar years was
essentially a secular one. In relation to the war rumours of 1945–7, he argues that the
‘the apocalyptic language of religious protest, identiﬁed by [Lynne] Viola in the 1930s,
had been supplanted by a more earthly day of reckoning for the Soviet government’.26
21 L.S. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement
(Stanford, CA 2009), 42.
22 Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, 24–8 (26). See also P. Deery, ‘The Dove Flies East: Whitehall,
Warsaw and the 1950 World Peace Congress’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 48, 4
(December 2002), 449–68. On Soviet press coverage see Dobson, ‘Building Peace’.
23 On the peace campaign’s reception in the USSR, see T. Johnston, Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour,
and Everyday Life under Stalin, 1939–1953 (Oxford 2011), 127–67.
24 On the Soviet regime’s attitude towards fear, see Dobson, ‘Building Peace’. On the way other Cold
War governments attempted to both cultivate and curtail fear, see F. Biess, ‘‘‘Everybody Has a
Chance’’. Civil Defense, Nuclear Angst, and the History of Emotions in Postwar Germany’, German
History, 27, 2 (2009), 215–43; J. Plamper, review of B. Greiner, C.T. Mu¨ller and D. Walter (eds), Angst
im Kalten Krieg (Hamburg 2009), for H-Soz-Kult. Available at: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/
rezensionen/2010-1-222 (accessed 7 October 2015).
25 Johnston, Being Soviet, 127–67.
26 T. Johnston, ‘Subversive Tales? War Rumours in the Soviet Union, 1945–1947’, in J. Fu¨rst (ed.)
Late Stalinist Russia: Society Between Reconstruction and Reinvention (London and New York, NY
2006), 62–78 (70).
366 Journal of Contemporary History 53(2)
In contrast, I use archival materials such as court ﬁles and oﬃcial reports to uncover
evidence of apocalyptic moods linked to fears of war. According to anthropologist
Mariia Akhmetova, grassroots movements anticipating the End Times have historic-
ally appeared in moments of crisis, including the seventeenth century, the revolution-
ary epoch, and the 1990s.27 Although at this juncture they did not consolidate into a
signiﬁcant religious movement, these apocalyptic moods embodied a vision that
clashed with communist eschatology, and caused suﬃcient alarm to draw their puta-
tive authors in the wave of state repression that hit in the late 1940s.
The second half of the article turns to the state’s attempt to build a patriotic
campaign around the notion of peace, focusing in particular on its curious decision
to involve religious organizations in the movement. Witnessing how the USA sought
to harness Christian organizations, including the World Council of Churches, a
leading ﬁgure in the governmental apparatus responsible for religious matters, I.V.
Polianskii, suggested the USSR take a similar tack, fashioning its own ‘ecumenical
movement’. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) would, of course, play the lead-
ing role: the Stalinist leadership had forged an alliance with the ROC from the mid-
point of the war;28 and this special relationship was to continue into the postwar
period.29 In the late 1940s, the international peace campaigns now oﬀered the prime
arena in which the ROC was expected to showcase its support for Soviet values, in
addition to the ﬁnancial contribution it was required to make to WPC funds.30
Polianskii’s proposed ecumenical movement required the involvement of religious
organizations other than the ROC, however: the participation of leading Muslim,
Jewish and Protestant ﬁgures, alongside Orthodox counterparts, in international
peace events would – Polianskii’s logic ran – convey the universal nature of support
for the Soviet initiative and the tolerance of the atheist regime in allowing them a
public presence. This attempt to orchestrate a religious dimension to the peace mes-
sage was not unproblematic. Not only was it contested within some government
circles, it placed high demands upon on religious leaders who now had to comment
on the international situation in terms that were both acceptable to the communist
authorities and in keeping with the tenets of their own faith. Eschatological
27 M. Akhmetova, Konets sveta v odnoy otedel’no vziatoi strane: religioznye soobshchestva postsovets-
koi Rossii i ikh eskhatalogicheskii mif (Moscow 2010).
28 Some scholars explain the wartime alliance primarily in terms of international factors, particularly
the government’s desire to woo Western allies with evidence of its tolerance for religion. See D.
Pospielovsky, The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia (Crestwood, NY 1998), 286. In a recent
article, Dianne Kirby suggests that both US and Soviet leaders were keen to exploit religion, arguing
that Franklin Roosevelt and Stalin ‘sought to make Christianity a bridge between East and West’.
Kirby, ‘From Bridge to Divide’, 722. Steven Merritt Miner acknowledges these diplomatic motivations,
but places greater emphasis on the Soviet government’s use of the Russian Orthodox Church as an
instrument of control in territories conquered in 1939-41 and then again after occupation, as well as in
Eastern Europe. S. Merritt Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–
1945 (Chapel Hill, NC 2003). On this see also: A. Dickinson, ‘Domestic and Foreign Policy
Considerations and the Origins of Post-War Soviet Church-State Relations, 1941–6’, in Kirby (ed.),
Religion and the Cold War, 23–36.
29 L.N. Leustean, ‘Eastern Christianity and the Cold War: An Overview’, in Leustean (ed.), Eastern
Christianity and the Cold War, 1945–91 (London 2010), 1–15.
30 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, 271–4.
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interpretations of the contemporary world that were criminalized when they
appeared in the vernacular culture (examined in the ﬁrst half of the article), now
had to ﬁnd forms that were acceptable to the Soviet state.
Fearing the prospect of renewed and even more devastating conﬂict, some indi-
viduals and groups used scripture to make sense of the contemporary world; in
apocalyptic rumours and so-called ‘holy letters’; in sermons preached at informal
gatherings; and in petitions to the peace congresses penned by religious leaders.
Conscious of the west’s harnessing of religion, and the USA’s deﬁnition of the Cold
War in terms of religious crusade, the Soviet state took a bifurcated approach to
these voices, outlawing some as ‘anti-Soviet’, but adopting, sculpting and publiciz-
ing others to add weight to their own international campaigns. After an initial
examination of the religious resurgence of the 1940s and its relationship to the
emerging Cold War, this article focuses on the treatment of Protestants during the
ﬁnal bout of Stalinist repression and the fury of Khrushchev’s anti-religious cam-
paigns. Protestants (in particular Baptists, Evangelical Christians and Pentecostals)
demonstrate the state’s dualistic approach particularly well. Along with other so-
called ‘sectarians’, they were demonized as paciﬁsts and prophets of the apocalypse,
but – unlike Jehovah’s Witnesses who were condemned outright as ‘enemies of the
state’ – they were also employed symbolically as spokesmen for the Soviet version
of ‘peace’. Their story points to the fundamental diﬃculty the regime encountered
as it fashioned its response to the Cold War, and in particular to the contested
place of religious outlooks in both oﬃcial and unoﬃcial cultures faced with the
prospect of a future conﬂict.
During the Second World War, the USSR witnessed a religious resurgence.31
Even before Stalin’s meeting with the heads of the ROC in 1943, widespread
expectations of a thaw in church-state relations emboldened many believers to
gather for worship and prayer, and this grassroots activity only increased in the
ﬁnal two years of war.32 In occupied territories, with the atheist authorities tem-
porarily out of sight, religious life was even more vibrant.33 The revitalization of
31 For an official report which identified the war as the beginning of an alarming religious resurgence
which continued into the postwar years, see GARF f. 6991, op. 3, d. 47, ll. 224–43. Key works of
secondary literature which trace the religious growth of the war and postwar periods include Miner,
Stalin’s Holy War; M.V. Shkarovskii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ pri Staline i Khrushcheve: gosu-
darstvenno-tserkovnye otnosheniia v SSSR v 1939-1964 godakh (Moscow 1999); T.A. Chumachenko,
Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodox from World War II to the Khrushchev Years, ed.
and transl. Edward E. Roslof (Armonk, NY and London 2002); D. Peris, ‘‘‘God is Now on Our Side’’:
The Religious Revival on Unoccupied Soviet Territory during World War II’, Kritika: Explorations in
Russian and Eurasian History, 1, 1 (Winter 2000), 97–118.
32 U. Huhn, ‘‘‘Krasnye tserkvi’’ i ‘‘pechat’ antikhrista’’. Tserkovnoe podpol’e, narodnoe pravoslavie i
slukhi v kontekste religioznogo vozrozhdenia posle 1943g.’, in I.V. Narskii (ed.) Slukhi v Rossii XIX-XX
vekov. Neofitsial’naia kommunikatsiia i ‘‘krutye povoroty’’ rossiiskoi istorii. Sbornik statei (Cheliabinsk
2011), 276–88.
33 K.C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA
2004), 232–52.
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congregational life during the war aﬀected not only the Russian Orthodox, but also
other denominations including Protestants.34 As we shall see in more detail later,
however, the state’s new approach did not signal a straightforward relaxation, but
instead entrenched a division between groups that were registered with the state,
and those that escaped its oversight and control. Small followings sprang up
around prophetic individuals, both men and women, within the Orthodox and
evangelical traditions alike.35 One practice that particularly alarmed the authorities
was the exchange of rumours and texts predicting an imminent Judgement Day.
Rather than dissipating, these apocalyptic moods seemed to intensify as cold-war
tensions peaked in the late 1940s.
Anxiety about the future was perhaps inevitable in the wake of a war that had
left such a trail of devastation and a peace that oﬀered little reprieve. In 1946
famine took approximately two million lives and a generation of children devel-
oped chronic health problems as a result of malnutrition.36 The Soviet media made
no reference to this new trauma, but some kind of explanatory framework was
evidently needed, and some people turned to the eschatological narratives oﬀered
in scripture. In Tambov region, for example, one local oﬃcial working for the
Council of Aﬀairs of Religious Cults (CARC)37 noted the growth of ‘religious
moods’ following what he euphemistically called the ‘crop failure’ [neurozhai],
before commenting on the dissemination of ‘holy letters’. He told his superiors
in Moscow:
A large quantity of anonymous letters – which postmen jokingly call ‘God’s letters’
[pis’ma bozhie] – have been delivered to the addresses of people living in cities . . .The
content of the letters is the following: The antichrist has come, soon the world will
end. People will face terrible misfortunes, disasters, and horrors. Only believers who
have repented will be saved.
The recipient could save herself by passing the letter on to no fewer than 20 or
30 people.38As the decade progressed the impact of the famine declined, but fears
of the End Times did not. In 1948, Metropolitan Veniamin of the ROC returned to
34 On the revival among Protestants, see T.K. Nikol’kaia, Russkii protestantizm i gosudarstvennaia
vlast’ (Saint Petersburg 2009), 120–2.
35 On the Orthodox church see Beglov, V poiskakh, 203–3. In a 1947 report Polianskii cited the case of
an ECB congregation in the Omsk region that had invited so-called ‘prophetesses-hysterical women’
[klikushy-prorochitsy] to their prayer meeting and widely advertised their ability to predict the future in
the village. See GARF f. 6991, op. 3, d. 47 l. 232. In the coming years, state officials would pay
particular attention to what they considered the dangerous role of the prophetess within Pentecostal
communities. See TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, d. 1572, l. 22, and l. 89–91; Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv
sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI) f. 17, op. 132, d. 497, ll. 72–3.
36 The figure of two million deaths in the years 1946–8 comes from historian V.F. Zima, cited in E.
Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1957 (Armonk, NY 1998),
47. On the effect of war on children’s health, see J. Fu¨rst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-war
Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford 2010), 34–6.
37 CARC was established in 1944; further details are given later in the article.
38 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Tambovskoi oblasti (GATO), f. 5220, op. 3s, d. 9, l. 12.
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the USSR from North America, where he had spent almost three decades.
In a report composed for G.G. Karpov, Chairman of the Council for the Aﬀairs
of the Russian Orthodox Church (hereafter CAROC),39 he laid out certain features
of the religious situation in Latvia, the very ﬁrst of which was the widespread
nature of fears that the end of the world was nigh. ‘This [idea], he wrote, ‘‘some-
times leads to pathological fanaticism, and even on occasion to madness’.40 In the
same year, and at almost the other end of the Soviet Union, local oﬃcials in Altai
region were reporting a similar trend. Amongst believers, it was alleged, anti-Soviet
elements had recently spread rumours about the inevitability of war, using citations
from the scriptures as evidence. One rumour claimed that if the USA and Turkey
went to war against the USSR, Soviet power would dissolve: ‘It is written in the
scriptures that before the end of the world there will be three wars, after which
there will be one king for the whole earth and this is what is happening’.41 In May
1950, reporting to M.A. Suslov, secretary of the party’s Central Committee,
Karpov himself observed that in February and May a wave of ‘mass mysticism’
involving the ‘so-called ‘‘renewal’’’ (obnovlenie) of icons had swept through western
regions of Belorussia. At the same time rumours claimed that a war would begin in
1950, a prediction based on the fact that the sum of the ﬁgures (1+9+5+0)
came to 15, as had the fateful years of 1914 and 1941.42
Like his colleague in Tambov three years earlier, Karpov reported on the dissem-
ination of ‘holy letters’. He included an example for his Central Committee readers:
The holy letter was recounted by a 12 year-old boy. Near the White Sea stood a man
in a white robe [riza] and in front of him was written ‘Do not forget the Lord God’.
Write this letter out nine times. He who does so will have joy within six days. One
woman wrote it, but forgot to pass it on, and she received an incurable disease.
Pray to God twice a day. In the name of the father and the son and the holy spirit.43
Amen.
Christ said: ‘Half of the people will perish on the 12th June 1950 and on the 15th all
the rivers and lakes will ﬁll up [napolniatsia] and the sun will grow dim and will
stop shining’.44
This is a bleak vision of the future, oﬀering believers little real sense that redemp-
tion was possible, for while the letter might help protect those who passed it on in
this life (bringing happiness, preventing disease), there is no mention of what might
39 CAROC was established in 1943; further details are given later in the article.
40 RGASPI f. 17, op 132, d. 6, ll. 177–82.
41 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 593, ll. 121–30.
42 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 285, ll. 96–8.
43 Capitalization, or lack thereof, is preserved from the original report.
44 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 285, ll. 96–8.
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occur after 15 June. At almost the same time that Karpov submitted his memo,
the department of propaganda and agitation also received a letter from a Pravda
reporter based in Poltava region (Ukraine) who had found a ‘holy letter’ in her
mailbox which she attributed to local ‘sectarians’.45 The letter was almost identical
to the ﬁrst, except for the ending which contained an explicit reference to a new world
war and an allusion to the possibility of salvation, albeit brief: ‘Christ himself said
that on 12 June 1950 half the world will end. On 15 July there will be a world war and
on 16th the sun will stop shining. People will recall the hours and the days, but by
then it will be too late. Anyone who preserves this letter will be saved. Amen’.46
While there is no explicit reference to the Cold War in either letter, it is sug-
gestive that they make reference to ‘half’ the world, or ‘half’ the people, being
destroyed, hinting at the bipolar dispositions encouraged by the international con-
ﬂict; this contrasts to the Book of Revelations where devastation is repeatedly
wreaked on a third, rather than a half, of the world.47 Both letters oﬀer concrete
prophecy: Judgment Day is not some distant date but predicted to happen that
very summer. According to oﬃcial reports, apocalyptic fears seemed to continue
rising into the fall of 1950. In a subsequent report, Karpov informed his readers
that in Voronezh region some collective and state farms’ work had been seriously
disrupted as people began to prepare for the end of the world.48
Neither the practice of writing and disseminating letters, nor the eschatological
frameworks they deployed, were new of course.49 Canonical Orthodox teaching
may have been, in the words of Leonid Heretz, ‘reticent on the time and indications
of the Second Coming’, but popular religion had long developed its own ‘folk
eschatology’:50 the darkening sun which appears in the 1950s holy letters drew
on centuries-old Russian folk tradition.51 Indeed, the writing of holy letters was
45 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 285, ll. 39–41 (39).
46 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 285, l. 43.
47 The devastation of the natural world which follows the breaking of the seventh seal, including the
sun and the moon turning dark, are to be found in the Book of Revelations, chapter 8. Here it is a third
rather than a half of the world that is destroyed. For example, in verse 7: ‘A third of the earth was burnt,
a third of the trees were burnt, all the green grass was burnt’. In verse 12: ‘The fourth angel blew his
trumpet; and a third part of the sun was struck, a third of the moon, and a third of the stars, so that the
third part went dark and a third of the light of the day failed, and of the night’.
48 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 285, ll. 198–9.
49 On the history of ‘texts as amulets’ see W.F. Ryan, The Bathhouse at Midnight: Magic in Russia
(Stroud 1999), 293–308. On ‘letters from heaven’, particularly in Eastern European history, see A.
Zayarnyuk, ‘Letters from heaven: an encounter between the ‘‘national movement’’ and ‘‘popular cul-
ture’’’, in J.-P. Himka and Zayarnyuk (eds), Letters from Heaven: Popular Religion in Russia and
Ukraine (Toronto 2006), 165–200.
50 L. Heretz, Russia on the Eve of Modernity: Popular Religion and Traditional Culture under the Last
Tsars (Cambridge 2008), 103–4. Andrew Louth notes that in Eastern Orthodox eschatology the empha-
sis is primarily on ‘the resurrection of Christ, the ultimate fount of all Christian hope’. A. Louth,
‘Eastern Orthodox Eschatology’, in J.L. Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology (New
York, NY 2008), 233–48 (233).
51 Revelations 6:12. In the Golubinnaia Kniga, described by W.F. Ryan as ‘that curious seventeenth-
century compendium of popular cosmological and eschatological beliefs in the form of a ‘‘spiritual
verse’’’, we find two poems which describe the darkening sun as omen of the End Times. See L.F.
Soloshchenko and I.S. Prokoshina (eds), Golubinnaia kniga. Russkie narodnye dukhovnye stikhi XI - XIX
vekov (Moscow 1991), 249 and 256; Ryan, The Bathhouse at Midnight, 73.
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itself a long-established practice, and one that – like fears of the End Times – cut
across denominational boundaries.52 Yet their reappearance and re-working in the
late 1940s is indicative of a new climate of anxiety, particularly given the imminence
of the End Times they predicted.53 Stephen Smith has recently explored how various
religious practices, including the production of ‘heavenly letters’, survived the
Bolshevik revolution not so much as vestiges of the past (the ‘perezhitki’ the
Bolsheviks so persistently lamented), but as ‘re-energized’ elements of Soviet culture.
Smith argues that the greater distribution of such letters at the end of the 1920s, and
a groundswell of prophetic tales on the brink of war in 1940, is evidence that they
ﬂourish not in moments of ‘massive social dislocation itself – violent collectivization
or Nazi invasion – but during the period just prior to the onset of disaster – that is, to
the period when a threat loomed, yet when it still seemed possible to avert it’.54
According to Smith, the purpose of the chain letter was to create a new epistolary
community and, in promising ‘divine protection to transcribers’, to allay anxiety;
they are not a call for arms but an invitation to ‘prepare for the Last Times’ through
increased piety.55 Following this interpretation, it is perhaps not so surprising that
the start of the Cold War – a war which hovered on the horizon, menacing but
unconsummated, generating anxiety but not requiring action – led to a resurgence of
the holy letters. In a world where the possibility of universal destruction was hinted
at but not expressed, where the danger was everywhere and nowhere, this surely felt
like a pre-catastrophe moment. The wave of letter-writing thus points to a fear that
some greater disaster was near. Certainly, in the second of the two texts cited above,
the author is clear what this disaster was: a new world war.
The regime read into the exchange of rumours and letters that ﬂourished in 1950
– as the proxy war in Korea unfurled and the peace campaigns reached a peak in
intensity – a response to contemporary political events, and a response quite dif-
ferent in nature from the patriotic endorsement it had hoped to cultivate. Faced
with a renascent religious culture, characterized at least in places by a fear of
impending conﬂict, the authorities took an increasingly punitive approach to
those who participated, as it did in many areas of Soviet life by the end of the
1940s. But even though the phenomena described here crossed denominational
boundaries, and indeed were most commonly described by oﬃcials responsible
for monitoring Orthodox life, it was those deemed religious outsiders who bore
52 A.A. Panchenko, Khristovshchina i skopchestvo: fol’klor i traditsionnaia kul’tura russkikh mistiches-
kikh sekt (Moscow 2002), 344. See also A.A. Panchenko, ‘‘‘Magicheskoe pis’mo’’ i izuchenie religioz-
nogo fol’klora’’, Antroplogiia religioznosti (St Petersburg 1998), 175–216.
53 These letters are much shorter than those analysed by Andriy Zayarnyuk in his examination of
‘letters from heaven’ in late nineteenth-century Galicia. They are also characterized by a much greater
sense of urgency. Zayarnyuk, ‘Letters from heaven’.
54 Stiven Smit [Steve Smith], ‘Nebesnye pis’ma i rasskazy o lese: ‘‘sueveriia’’ protiv bol’shevizma’,
Antropologicheskii forum, 3 (2005), 280–306 (296).
55 In this regard, Smith’s interpretation of holy letters differs from Lynne Viola’s analysis of rumours
circulating during the period of collectivization itself. She suggests that the apocalypse provided peas-
ants with a ‘vocabulary of rebellion’. L. Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the
Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York, NY 1996), 55–61 (55). See also N. Werth, ‘Rumeurs defai-
tistes et apocalypticques dans l’URSS des anne´es 1920 et 1930’, Vingtie`me Sie`cle, 71, 1 (2001): 25–35.
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the brunt of the blame: the Pravda journalist who attributed authorship of the holy
letter she received to local ‘sectarians’ was hardly alone. As we shall now see, the
wave of repression against ‘religious anti-Soviet elements’ was particularly severe
for those adhering to non-Orthodox traditions. This attack on the ‘sectarian’ was
an approach which had pre-revolutionary roots but gained new prominence and
severity as the Cold War escalated.
In Imperial Russia, the ‘sectarian’ had already received a great deal of attention not
only from the state, but also from the Orthodox church and the intelligentsia.
Groups that emerged over the course of the eighteenth century – the dancing,
whirling khlysty, the self-castrated skoptsy, the paciﬁst Molokans and
Dukhobors – were perceived as threats to ‘social order’ by the government.56
Socialists often took a diﬀerent stance: from the Populists to the Bolsheviks,
there was a tradition of seeing the ‘sectarian’ as a possible ally, his non-conformity
a form of social protest against the imperial regime.57 Both those attracted to, and
those repulsed by, the ‘sectarian’ were ﬁxated with the unusual forms of worship
and ritual such groups were alleged to practise, especially concerning their sexual
customs.58 When communities began to form under the inﬂuence of Protestant
teaching in the late nineteenth century, ‘Evangelical Christians’ and Baptists (here-
after ECBs) were also grouped under the (pejorative) term ‘sectarian’.59 In the
following decades the ranks of the ‘sectarian’ were further enlarged and diversiﬁed
by the arrival of Pentecostalism and, with the annexation of new eastern-European
territories during the Second World War, Jehovah’s Witnesses.60
Despite some initial overtures to the ‘sectarians’, Soviet anti-religious policy
shows the Bolsheviks’ earlier sympathies were not sustained: the 1930s were a
bloody decade for both Orthodox and ‘sectarian’ believers alike.61 From the
mid-point of the war the government took a less hostile tack, seeing to create
some kind of legitimate space for religious worship, albeit one that it could super-
vise and regulate. With this aim, two new bodies were created in 1943–4: the
56 L. Engelstein, Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale (Ithaca, NY 1999), 51.
Nicholas Breyfogle speaks of the nineteenth-century exile of Molokans and Dukhobors as a form of
‘communal isolation’ intended to prevent ‘heretical ‘‘infection’’ of Orthodox subjects’. N.B. Breyfogle,
Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia’s Empire in the South Caucasus (Ithaca, NY 2005), 2.
57 A. Etkind, ‘Whirling with the Other: Russian Populism and Religious Sects’, Russian Review, 62, 4
(October 2003), 565–88. For a Soviet explanation of the pre-revolutionary Social Democrats’ interest of
the sectarian, see A.I. Klibanov, E. Dunn (trans), S.P. Dunn (ed.), History of Religious Sectarianism in
Russia (1860s–1917) (Oxford 1982), 1–14. On the role of the Old Bolshevik Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, a
specialist on the ‘sectarian’, see also Engelstein, Castration, and A. Etkind, Khlyst: sekty, literatura i
revoliutsiia (Moscow 1998).
58 Etkind, Khlyst. See also O.I. Panych, ‘Mif pro baptystiv u radians’komu suspil’stvi 1950-1980-kh
rr.: marnovirstvo i propaganda’, Ukrains’kyi istorychniy zhurnal, 2011 (May–June), 121–40.
59 H.J. Coleman, Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905–1929 (Bloomington, IL 2005),
100–4.
60 Baran, Dissent on the Margins,14–30.
61 A.I. Savin, ‘Repressii v otnoshenii evangel’skikh veruiushchikh v khode ‘kulatskoi operatsii’’, in M.
Iunge, B. Bonvech and R. Binner (eds), Stalinizm v sovetskoi provintsii: 1937-1938 gg. : massovaia
operatsiia na osnove prikaza 00447 (Moscow, 2009), 303–42.
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Council for the Aﬀairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) and the
Council for the Aﬀairs of Religious Cults (CARC) for other Christian denomin-
ations and other faiths. CAROC and CARC deployed plenipotentiaries across the
country with the task of monitoring religious life. At the same time, the creation of
Moscow-based religious organizations (such as the ‘All-Union Council of
Evangelical Christians-Baptists’, hereafter AUCECB) aided ecclesiastical central-
ization. These measures, along with the attempt to register large numbers of reli-
gious groups, gave believers greater freedom in some regards, but it also made them
more visible and accountable to the authorities. The new approach adopted in the
years 1944–7 did not signal, moreover, a conclusive end to religious persecution.
And when a new wave of repression was unleashed, certain ‘sectarian’ groups were
targeted disproportionately.
Internal correspondence between the leadership of CARC and the party’s
Central Committee shows how and why the wartime reprieve was so quickly
reversed. The year 1947 witnessed a signiﬁcant shift, with two clear positions
emerging: on the one hand, CARC defended the new more lenient approach,
while on the other members of the Central Committee raised doubts about the
loyalty of certain religious groups.62 Following an extended exchange of views, in
the summer of 1947, Stalin signed a decree meant to strengthen CARC and to
provide better conditions for its plenipotentiaries, but which also introduced a
bifurcated policy: registration for Old Believers, Muslims, Buddhists and the
Armenian Apostolic Church was to continue in areas where they lacked prayer
houses, while petitions for registrations coming from Roman Catholic, Jewish,
Lutheran, and ‘sectarian’ congregations were only to be approved in ‘highly excep-
tional circumstances’. The Cold War leaves a clear imprint here: religious commu-
nities associated with capitalist countries saw their opportunities for registration
dramatically scaled back, while those without such links were protected. (The ROC
did come under attack albeit a little later, primarily in late 1948 and early 1949,
but in May 1949 Stalin personally intervened to halt an out-and-out campaign.)63
The decree also recommended reducing the number of existing prayer houses,
‘especially sectarian ones’.64
The viliﬁcation of the ‘sectarian’ is reﬂected in the increasing numbers of
arrests. O.B. Mozokhin’s archival research into the workings of the extra-judiciary
organs provides a breakdown of arrests according to the ‘nature of the charge’
[okraski otcheta].65 According to his ﬁgures, the number of those apprehended by
62 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506.
63 Chumachenko, Church and State, 94–101.
64 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, ll. 183–4.
65 In general, precise figures are hard to come by given that convictions were under general articles
(for example, article 58/10 ‘Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda’), rather than ones specific to reli-
gious activity. Mozokhin’s work is unusual in trying to disaggregate the different reasons given for
arrest. See O.B. Mozokhin, Pravo na repressii: Vnesudebnye polnomochiia organov gosudastvennoi bezo-
pastnosti (1918–1953) (Moscow 2006), 363–465. They are also presented, and discussed, in Savin,
‘Repressii v otnoshenii evangel’skikh veruiushchikh’.
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the Ministry of State Security (MGB) as ‘religious anti-Soviet elements’ jumped
signiﬁcantly in 1949, with over 3000 cases per year in 1949, 1950 and 1951 (com-
pared to under 2000 arrests in 1945). Mozokhin’s ﬁgures suggest that the ‘sectarian’
was disproportionately targeted, and increasingly so: the percentage of ‘sectarians’
within the category of ‘religious anti-Soviet elements’ was 50 per cent in 1945, rising
to 72 per cent in 1952.66 Records from the Soviet Procruacy, the judicial body
responsible for reviewing sentencing practices, paint a similar picture: at the end of
the Stalin era, Baptists, Evangelical Christians, Pentecostals and (unsurprisingly)
Jehovah’s Witnesses were ﬁnding themselves charged under article 58/10 – anti-
Soviet agitation and propaganda – rather more commonly than their Orthodox
counterparts.67 According to the indictments made against them, they used scrip-
ture to both predict and condemn a looming war. While many aspects of the
charges can be read as fantasies about what the sectarian did and said, they
required some grounding in actual religious practices and beliefs, however tenuous,
to make them convincing texts. In addition to their potential aﬃnities with fellow
believers overseas, two aspects of the evangelical tradition helped to give the
charges a veneer of veracity: the tradition of paciﬁsm and the tendency towards
pre-millennial dispositions (that is, their expectation of a period of conﬂict and
strife prior to Christ’s second coming).
Let us begin with a case from Riazan’ which blends political charges germane to
the Cold War (paciﬁsm and pro-Americanism), with long-established notions of
the depraved behaviour of the sectarian. According to the charges, a woman born
in 1900 stood accused of organizing a Pentecostal group in the immediate postwar
years; alongside her in the dock were the two men whom she had recruited as
preacher and prophet. All three were charged with praising various un-Soviet phe-
nomena (pre-revolutionary Russia, the life of believers in the USA, and
the German occupation during the Second World War), as well as spreading
rumours of an impending war, the defeat of Soviet power, and the salvation of
all believers. During this war, they allegedly said, believers should ﬁre into the air,
as shooting the enemy was a sin.68 Although at the time such cases were not
reported in the press, this woman later appeared in an anti-religious tract which
claimed that, in addition to the ‘wild habits’ of the Pentecostals, she brought her
66 It is not entirely clear what is included in the category ‘sectarian’, though it is worth noting that the
Orthodox dukhovenstvo, Lutherans, Muslims, Buddhists, Catholics, Uniates and Jewish religious leaders
are listed separately from 1948 (Pravo na repressii, 392).
67 For cases reviewed in 1953, many of them relating to incidents that allegedly occurred in the late
1940s or early 1950s, those involving members of Pentecostal and ECB congregations exceeded those
identified as Orthodox. The most well-represented denomination is the Jehovah’s Witnesses. These
findings are drawn from 900-page book compiled by researchers at GARF which offers summaries
of cases relating to 4855 men and women charged under article 58/10, or its successor article 190,
between 1953 and 1991 approximately 60 per cent of those charged. The materials are drawn from
the archives of the USSR Procuracy’s ‘department for oversight of investigations by state security’. V.A.
Kozlov and S.V. Mironenko (eds), O.V. Edel’man (compiler), 58/10 Nadzornye proizvodstva prokura-
tury SSSR po delam ob antisovetskoi agitatsii i propogande: annotirovannyi katalog mart 1953–1991
(Moscow 1999).
68 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 47273.
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own innovations, making believers crawl behind her on their knees and blowing
into their mouths.69 This accretion of disparate allegations was typical of Stalinist
criminal justice, as if the very diﬀuseness of the charges somehow endowed them with
an aura of truth. Charges against other Pentecostals contained a similar melding of the
religious and the political, with prophesy, wild prayer, and the refusal to bear arms
regular oﬀences.70 Three ‘evangelist-baptists’ found themselves – like the Riazan’
Pentecostals – facing a whole raft of accusations: praising life in pre-revolutionary
Russia, spreading rumours about the disbandment of collective farms, saying ‘Heil
Hitler’, listening to Voice of America, predicting a war with the USA and refusing to
bear arms. Interestingly, in his petition letter, one of the defendants denied all the
charges except for the latter.71 In the same year, a Baptist who belonged to a registered
ECB congregation was sentenced to 25 years because, as he explained in his subse-
quent petition letter, he had refused to participate in military training in early 1953.72
Alongside the charges of foreign allegiance, paciﬁsm was the cornerstone of many
indictments.
In other cases, expectation that Christ’s second coming was imminent – and
would be preceded by a period of conﬂict and suﬀering – was used to cast the
believer as an opponent of Soviet progress. One elderly collective farmer from
Iaroslav region was accused of leading an illegal sect of Evangelical Christians
from 1949 to 1952. According to witness statements, some of them provided by
young city girls billeted with him while helping with the harvest, he had also
criticized Soviet agricultural policy, used scripture to predict an imminent world
war, and announced the coming of the Anti-Christ.73 A group of Ukrainian evan-
gelicals – whether they were Baptist or Pentecostal is unclear – stood trial in
Uzbekistan. Local procurators maintained: ‘At their meetings, they preached
that the ‘‘end of the world’’ is coming, that inevitably ‘‘life will perish’’, that the
Soviet people ‘‘must perish’’, and that God will destroy Soviet power with an
inextinguishable ﬁre.’74 In Kirovabad in Azerbaijan, two Pentecostals were accused
of scaring members of their ‘sect’ with references to the ‘end of the world’ and the
judgement facing un-believers.75 On the most western fringes of Ukraine, eight
members of a ‘Sabbath Pentecostal’76 group had conducted missionary work in a
number of villages, it was alleged, warning people that at Judgement Day non-
believers would be destroyed and not only Soviet rule, but all earthly powers,
would be annihilated, leaving God to reign for eternity.77
69 E. Tsvetogorov, Sektanty i chto oni propoveduiut (Novosibirsk 1960), 60.
70 See for example, GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46115, ll 3–6.
71 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 61302, especially l. 34.
72 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 47431.
73 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 38166.
74 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 44594, l. 6.
75 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 43671.
76 The ‘subbotsvuiushchie’ were Pentecostals who worshipped on a Saturday. According to T.K.
Nikol’skaia, they emerged in the Zakarpats’ka region before the Second World War when it was
under Polish rule. T.K. Nikol’skaia, ‘‘Avgustovskoe soglashenie.’’ i pozitsii piatidesiatnikov v 40-50-
kh. gg. XX v., Gosudarstvo, Religiia, Tserkov’ v Rossii i za rubezhom, 2010 (no. 4), 124–33 (127–8).
77 GARF f. 8131, op 31, d. 65445, ll. 5–10.
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In the context of a society based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, prediction of the
End Times could all too easily be read as an assault on the Revolution’s promise to
create a ‘shining future’. In a number of cases, investigators claimed that defend-
ants, inspired by the Book of Revelations, not only prophesied the coming of the
antichrist but even identiﬁed Lenin or Stalin as his embodiment. Let us take the
example of an evangelical woman, A.E. Tsvetkova, originally from a Ukrainian
village, who lived in the postwar period in the Sakhalin region, working from home
as a licensed dressmaker.78 According to witness statements, she held gatherings
where she read from the Bible and explained passages, saying
there will be drought, hunger, disease and people will beg God to let them die, but they
won’t die, just carry on suﬀering. Soon the sun will turn dark, and the moon will turn
to blood, the devil will blow smoke which will burn with ﬂames. This will happen
because people disrespected God.79
Another witness claimed Tsvetkova said: ‘The ﬁrst devil has been, and died, and
now the second is carrying out the dragon’s aﬀairs’.80 Another case from 1953
involved Elena Tarasova, a native of Mogilev. A member of a Pentecostal sect
from 1947, she allegedly refused to participate in elections, advised her son and
others to refuse military service, and praised capitalist countries. In December
1952, she wrote two letters addressed to the World Peace Council. In one letter,
she directed her reader to various verses from the Book of Revelations in
which she identiﬁed the two beasts as Lenin and Stalin.81 Her second letter
was more prosaic: ‘There are rumours’, she wrote, ‘that the American govern-
ment has set aside 100 million dollars to save people who are not subject to
humane law. I beg you not to refuse me and to include me amongst those
resettled [pereselentsy]’.82
What is striking about this last case is that the believer addressed her concerns to
the World Peace Council. Its political role was apparently oblique to her and she
imagined it as an external institution that might, alongside the US government,
choose to intervene in Soviet life to save her. The WPC appears in another case;
here the harmonious future promised by the peace movement was descried as an
illusion masking the true desolation the world found itself in. The case concerned
four men and two women living in a Novosibirsk village – all but one of them exiles
or former convicts – who were sentenced to 25 years’ corrective labour under article
58 in 1953.83 Sergei Potapov was accused of having set up an anti-Soviet cell under
78 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 42255, l. 12. Her court records suggest there was an earlier three-year
sentence in 1939 under article 143 of the Ukrainian criminal code.
79 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 42255, l. 7.
80 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 42255, l. 8.
81 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 42255, l. 14.
82 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 56263, ll. 21–3.
83 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 54597, l. 9.
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the ‘cover of an ‘evangelical-baptist group’, and more speciﬁcally, of predicting the
imminent end of Soviet power.84One of his co-defendants allegedly testiﬁed in court:
I used to say that people greet each other ‘peace to the world’ [mir miru] but in fact
there will be a great war . . . the lord god will come and there will be a great judgment.
I said that in the Soviet Union they talk about freedom of speech and of religion, but
in fact it’s not like that, and the whole world is full of evil [lezhit v zle].85
‘Peace to the world’ was how the writer Il’ia Erenburg had ﬁnished his speech to the
World Congress of Partisans for Peace in 1949 and the slogan had been used widely
during the gathering of signatures for the Stockholm petition in 1950.86 Here the
believer condemns the false rhetoric of the peace campaigns and predicts instead
war and judgement. Despite their diﬀerent understandings of what the inter-
national peace movement stood for, the cases of Potapov and Tarasova suggest
the campaigns had penetrated deep into remote corners of the Soviet Union, but
with meanings far removed from those anticipated by the authorities: they did not
reassure believers but fed into fears of an impending crisis.
In describing the above cases, the words ‘alleged’, ‘accused’ and ‘apparently’ have
been interjected into almost every sentence. The cases are products of the late Stalinist
era, a time when fabricated witness statements and forced confessions were common-
place. As the work of Hiroaki Kuromiya amply demonstrates, we should treat the
ﬁles of the Stalinist criminal justice system with great wariness; in the trial of
Reformed Adventists that forms the centre-piece of his microhistory, he ﬁnds that
all of the charges laid were misrepresentation and fabrication.87 Reﬂections on scrip-
ture were often twisted beyond recognition, of course, and we should not read them
as accurate reports on what the accused said or did. But even if epistemological
caution prevails, we can see in the indictments laid against the ‘sectarian’ the autho-
rities’ attempts to isolate and exoticize certain practices and beliefs. Faced with a
religious resurgence they wanted to explain, neuter, and suppress, and by the threat of
nuclear war they refused to fully acknowledge, the Soviet authorities found in
Protestants’ paciﬁsm and pre-millennialism–however marginal and benign within
the denomination – handy tools for transforming them into a despised ﬁfth column.
Yet Protestants were never criminalized en masse as was the fate of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses.88 Despite the undesirable characteristics of their faith, and
their potential sympathies with believers in the capitalist world, Protestant church
leaders were not prevented from enlisting in the public performance of peace, as we
shall now see. It did, however, make their participation in the campaigns contro-
versial at the highest echelons of power. It also saddled church leaders with the
84 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 54597, l. 10.
85 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 54597, l. 13.
86 Il’ia Erenburg, Za mir! (Moscow 1950), 106.
87 H. Kuromiya, Conscience on Trial: The Fate of Fourteen Pacifists in Stalin’s Ukraine, 1952–1953
(Toronto 2012).
88 Baran, Dissent on the Margins, 44–69.
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diﬃcult task of commenting on cold-war hostilities in terms that were acceptable to
both their atheist master and to their Christian, and in some quarters paciﬁst,
followers.
Let us return to the pivotal year of 1947 and the exchange of memos between the
leaders of CARC and the party’s Central Committee (CC). This correspondence
reveals the conﬂicting perspectives that emerged with the onset of the Cold War as
leading government ﬁgures sought to weigh up the pros and cons of allowing reli-
gious groups a public presence. Writing to the CC on 1 July 1947, I.V. Polianskii,
chair of CARC, began by asserting that the defeat of fascism had led to a renewal of
reactionary forces, particularly Christianity. This had resulted in an ecumenical
movement opposed to communism, he said. Expressing alarm about western
attempts to ‘politicize religious activity’, Polianskii suggested it would be desirable
for the Soviet Union to create its own ‘ecumenical movement’ under the aegis of the
Russian Orthodox Church. Other religious organizations would participate and
would be encouraged to develop closer ties between themselves, he said.89 Of these
religious organizations, the Protestant one – the All-Union Council of Evangelical
Christians-Baptists (which included Pentecostals) – was the largest.90 It also
presented particular challenges for the Soviet state despite the commitment of its
leaders – many of whom had personally experienced Stalinist repression – to proving
their loyalty to the state in order to ensure the church’s survival.91
From the outset, a patriotic note was struck in Bratskii vestnik [Fraternal
Bulletin], the oﬃcial AUCECB journal which reported on key developments in
the organization’s work as well as oﬀering readers regular theological articles
and sermons. In its very ﬁrst edition, an editorial from Ia.I. Zhidkov, chair of
the AUCECB, praised the new unity of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, and
warned readers they would ﬁnd the word ‘rodina’ (motherland) many times in the
coming pages; faith and patriotism are not in conﬂict, he said, reminding readers of
Jesus’ own love for his native Israel. Zhidkov spelt out the implications of this
patriotic love very clearly: believers must obey the laws and decrees of their gov-
ernment and should carry out military service. He wrote: ‘To be a warrior like the
centurion from Capernaum (Matthew 8: 5–10) or the centurion Cornelius from
Caesarea (Acts of the Apostles 10: 1–2) should be the genuine desire of every
Christian warrior’.92 Under state pressure, both the Baptist and Evangelical
Christian Unions had repudiated the paciﬁst tradition in the 1920s and now, in
89 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, l. 110 and l. 118.
90 In terms of the number of registered congregations, at the beginning of 1946 the AUCECB – with
its 1429 registered prayer houses – was the largest denomination under CARC’s auspices, with the
exception of the Greek Catholic Church (GARF f. 6991, op. 4, d. 194, l. 1). In the spring of 1946
Greek Catholics were forcibly made to join the Russian Orthodox Church. By the beginning of 1947,
there were 2669 AUCECB registered prayer houses (RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, l. 33).
91 See the biographies of I.A. Zhidkov (incarcerated 1938–42) and A.V. Karev (incarcerated 1935–40)
in S.N. Savinskii, Istoriia evangel’skikh khristian-baptistov Ukrainy, Rossii, Belorussii, Ch. II: (1917–
1967) (St. Petersburg 2001), 377, 379.
92 ‘Khristianin i rodina’, Bratskii vestnik, 1945, no. 1.
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their revived and amalgamated incarnation as the AUCECB, leaders again told
believers that a refusal to bear arms was alien to their faith.93 The AUCECB
leadership also tended to say little on the subject of eschatology, even though a
premillennial disposition had been brought to Russian Protestantism from British
evangelical writings.94
For Polianskii and his colleagues, there was much to be praised in the
AUCECB’s initial work. CARC’s internal memos did not deny that the evangelical
communities presented particular problems for the Soviet state (the church’s inclin-
ation towards ‘anarchy’, its commitment to proselytism, and of course paciﬁst
traditions), but – at least in the early postwar period – they tended to depict its
members as being, by and large, patriotic citizens. They noted that for the most
part ECB believers completed their military service and that many had fought in
the war.95 CARC also stressed the key role their leaders were playing: at home,
they provided the kind of hierarchy and centralization hitherto missing; inter-
nationally, they advertised Soviet religious freedoms, as the 1946 visit of Louie
Newton, President of the South Baptist Convention, seemed to demonstrate.96 By
June 1947, however, the Central Committee denounced Polianskii’s views as simply
‘naı¨ve’ and criticized CARC for failing to see that the Evangelical Christians-
Baptist ‘sect’ – note the wording – was ‘able to adroitly adapt itself to new condi-
tions and hide its true face’, language typical of Stalinist rhetoric towards perceived
enemies. Central Committee memos noted censoriously that the Evangelical
Christians-Baptist communities were the only religious group still growing and
that their methods of recruitment were illegal ones; they criticized Bratskii vestnik
for trying to claim it was the sole guide to morality in the USSR; and they
denounced the leaders of the Baptist World Alliance as ‘the faithful servants of
Anglo-American capital’.97 With time, the head of CARC, Polianskii became more
cautious too, though he still maintained that the religious organizations (such as
93 W. Sawatsky, ‘Patsifisty-protestanty v Sovetskoi Rossii mezhdu dvumia mirovymi voinami’, in P.
Brock (ed.) Dolgii put’ rossiiskogo patsifizma: Ideal mezhdunarodnogo i vnutrennego mira v religiozno-
filosofskoi i obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli Rossii (Moscow 1997), 262–84; T. Pavlova, ‘Hundred
Years of Russian Pacifism’, Journal of Human Values, 5 (October 1999), 147–155. Nikol’kaia, Russkii
protestantizm, 47, 86; Coleman, Russian Baptists, 120–1, 180–97.
94 This point is made by both Walter Sawatsky and Alexander Popov. W. Sawatsky, Soviet
Evangelicals Since World War II (Kitchener, Ontario and Scottdale, PA 1981), 340–4; A. Popov,
‘The Evangelical Christians-Baptists in the Soviet Union as a hermeneutical community: examining
the identity of the All-Union Council of the ECB (AUCECB) through the way the Bible was used in its
publications’, unpublished thesis, University of Wales and Prague International Baptist Theological
Seminary (2010), 158–9.
95 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, l. 19; see another CARC report from 1947: RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d.
498, l. 119.
96 See the glowing report on the religious freedom he had witnessed during his time in the Soviet
Union: L.D. Newton, An American Churchman in the Soviet Union (New York, NY 1946). His writings
seem to have caused a stir among US readers, with both positive and negative reactions: GARF f. 5283,
op. 14, d. 425. On the other visits received by the AUCECB in these early postwar years see GARF f.
6991, op. 4, d. 6, l. 185. For CARC commentary on these international ties, see: RGASPI f. 17, op. 125,
d. 506, l.17–22; RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, ll. 26–65.
97 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, ll. 23–5. A further memo critical of CARC was sent by D. Shepilov
to M. A. Suslov, Central Committee secretary: RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, ll. 134–5.
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the AUCECB) were the best form of control over religious life and that an ecu-
menical movement was viable and beneﬁcial.98 Ultimately CARC was successful in
defending itself and the religious organizations overseen by CARC survived. For a
time, however, the international role these organizations were to play was more
ambiguous. The decree of July 1947 recommended that the Armenian Apostolic
Church and Muslim organizations should be encouraged to widen their inter-
national ties and help ‘propagandize’ the freedom of religion which existed in the
USSR, but the extent to which other groups, including the AUCECB, were to
cultivate links overseas would ‘depend on the concrete conditions of the
moment’.99
This rather equivocal instruction inevitably bred uncertainty. Without doubt,
the international proﬁle of the AUCECB was temporarily curtailed: between
November 1947 and May 1950, for example, no foreign visitors were oﬃcially
received at the Moscow Central Baptist Church.100 And as the peace movement
developed momentum in 1949 and 1950, Protestant leaders were not involved. In
April 1949, Polianskii contacted D.T. Shepilov at the Central Committee’s
Propaganda and Agitation Department informing him that in the run-up to the
World Congress of Partisans for Peace to be held in Paris that month he was
receiving requests from various religious organizations, including the AUCECB,
asking for their ‘Appeals in Defence of Peace’ to be published in the press.
Polianskii explained that although he did not object to what he called ‘patriotic
documents’, he did not support their publication, with the exception of an appeal
he had received from the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church.101
Shepilov advised against publication in all cases.102 At this early stage of the
peace campaigns, therefore, only the Russian Orthodox Church seemed to have
an assured role.103
Very gradually, nonetheless, the ecumenical movement got underway, and
AUCECB leaders made their way onto the international stage alongside other
faith leaders. Oﬃcial visits from foreign visitors re-commenced in May 1950.104
In October 1950, Zhidkov attended the ‘partisans of peace’ congress held in
Moscow and spoke on the radio, telling listeners that Evangelical Christians-
Baptists were not only praying for peace but actively taking part in the struggle
to achieve it.105 In May 1952, he was invited to a conference bringing together all
churches and religious organizations in the USSR to pursue the peace cause.
98 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, ll. 110-118 and ll. 144–63.
99 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, l. 184.
100 GARF f. 6991, op. 4, d. 6, ll. 185–6.
101 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 109, ll. 57-58: letter from Polianskii to the Central Committee on 8
April 1949.
102 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 109, l. 66.
103 For press coverage of the Russian Orthodox Church presence in Paris, see: ‘Predstaviteli Russkoi
pravoslavnoi tserkvi na Vsemirnii kongress storonnikov mira’, Izvestiia (12 April 1949), 4; ‘Rech’
mitropolita Krutitskogo i Kolomenskogo Nikolaia’, Izvestiia (24 April 1949), 3.
104 GARF f. 6991, op. 4, d. 6, l. 185.
105 ‘Uchastie evangel’skikh khristian-baptistov SSSR v dele zashchity mira’, Bratskii vestnik, 1953,
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A Pravda article recounted how participants had discussed Metropolitan Nikolai’s
lecture, entitled ‘The Church together with the People in the Struggle for Peace’;
ﬁrst on the roster of participants was Zhidkov, followed by Jewish, Muslim,
Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Buddhist representatives.106
The inclusion of the ECB church into public life did not always run smoothly,
however, for participation in the peace movement required more than sitting on the
stage at these public events. Zhidkov and his colleagues had to learn to articulate
the peace message appropriately. In 1949, his ﬁrst attempt at a peace ‘appeal’ had
rather missed the mark. He had made appropriate references to ‘feverish enemies’ –
a stalwart in the Stalinist lexicon – but he also depicted a future far more terrible
than was permissible within oﬃcial Soviet culture. Zhidkov wrote:
It is with great sadness that they [Evangelical Christians-Baptists] follow the feverish
actions of the enemies of peace who, calling themselves the defenders of Christian
civilization, prepare for the destruction of all human culture, the annihilation of the
majority of humankind by means of hellish [adskoi] atomic technology, and the trans-
formation of signiﬁcant expanses of the earth into desert.107
This rendition of the peace message is entirely at odds with the tenor of the Soviet
press, and not only because of the reference to atomic technology as ‘hellish’. As
suggested at the beginning of this article, Izvestiia and Pravda were highly
restrained in their treatment of nuclear war, giving readers little sense that what
might lie ahead would be substantively diﬀerent from the war they had just experi-
enced. No one was speaking of the possibility that a majority of the human race
might be destroyed or the world turned to desert.108
Even ﬁve years later, with the climate more relaxed after Stalin’s death, Zhidkov
and his colleagues were still articulating a message slightly at odds with the main-
stream press. A new peace appeal signed by the AUCECB leaders did now make it
on to the pages of Izvestiia, but its depiction of nuclear holocaust still pushed the
boundaries of what was acceptable.109 Its authors began by noting that although
international tensions had recently decreased, peace was still under threat, because
‘some governments’ wanted to arm West Germany. And ‘if West Germany is
armed, then the atomic bomb will hang over Europe, threatening to turn it into
a scorched desert in a matter of days’. By 1954, Stalin’s successors were willing to
acknowledge at least some of the dangers posed by the bomb, publishing a few
short reports on the radiation risks of US tests, but this vision of ecological disaster
was still daring.110 In his 1954 New Year message to the faithful, Zhidkov
warned readers that the new weapons would lead to the ‘destruction of people’
106 ‘Okonchanie raboty konferentsii vsekh tserkvei i religioznykh ob’’edinenii v SSSR, posviashchen-
noi voprosu zashchity miru’, Pravda (13 May 1952), 3.
107 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 109, l. 62.
108 On this see Dobson, ‘Building Peace’.
109 ‘Zaiavlenie Vsesoiuznogo Soveta evangel’skikh khristian-baptistov’, Izvestiia (22 December 1954), 4.
110 Dobson, ‘Building Peace’.
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[istreblenie liudei]; although he avoided references to the ‘annihilation of the major-
ity of humankind’ included in the (unpublished) 1949 text his prognosis for the
future was still rather ominous. And yet elsewhere in the same text, Zhidkov used
the Book of Revelations, not to predict an impending conﬂict in the pre-millennial
tradition, but to reject it:
We are people of peace, heralds of peace, defenders of peace, creators of peace, as
opposed to the forces of hell and darkness which, according to the book of
Revelations are deﬁned thus: ‘‘Then I saw . . . three foul spirits like frogs. These spirits
were devils . . .They were sent out to muster all the kings of the world for the great day
of battle’’. (Revelations 16: 13–14) We are not going the same way as these hellish
forces. Their evil actions – inciting war – isn’t for us. We are following the call of the
celestial, angelical forces, calling out ‘Peace on earth’.111
Here his theological disposition is implicitly more post-millennial than pre-millen-
nial for it rests on a belief in humankind’s capacity to build a better world ready for
the Second Coming. Christians must work to improve life on earth, rather than
bleakly waiting for the End Times. The conclusion of the article also reminded
readers what this meant in practice: military service in the Soviet army for all young
men. These two 1954 texts suggest that the AUCECB leaders were still prone to
rather graphic evocations of nuclear devastation, but they were nonetheless learn-
ing to articulate a peace message that was roughly in keeping with the patriotic,
even militaristic, register required.
With their potential for ties with co-believers in the USA, Protestants were in a
rather unique position, but in the early Cold War years it was unclear whether their
potential ties overseas made them very useful, or very suspect. The church’s paciﬁst
traditions, although disavowed by its leaders, certainly added to the mistrust. They
also created tensions within the ECB community itself. As early as July 1947,
AUCECB leaders were reporting to CARC that they had received a number of
letters from believers who disagreed with their leaders on the issue of military
service.112 CARC oﬃcials elsewhere noted opposition among believers to their
leaders’ participation in the peace movement. In 1952 local ECB pastors had
been instructed to read out Zhidkov’s contribution to the peace conference held
in Moscow; in the Ukrainian city of Nikolaev, an elderly female member of the
congregation said to her ‘sisters’, ‘This is the devil come to tempt us. If they try to
force you to sign a list, refuse.’ In Khar’kov, a believer submitted an anonymous
note which read ‘We stand for God’s peace [bozhii mir], but you preach a worldly
peace [chelovecheskii mir]’.113 In general terms, there developed a more deeply pre-
millennial outlook at grass-roots level than was propounded in the sermons and
111 ‘Novyi god i rozhdestvo’, Bratskii vestnik, 1954, no. 1.
112 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, l. 49
113 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, d. 1572, l. 224.
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articles of AUCECB leaders.114 All this weakened the domestic proﬁle of the
AUCECB and contributed to the schisms that were to characterize the church
from the 1950s onwards.115
Yet despite the many concerns, doubts, and criticisms, from 1950 the
Evangelical Christians-Baptists developed a public role in the Soviet Union.
Thus, at the very same time that a minority of Protestant believers found them-
selves on trial denounced as traitors and paciﬁsts, their church leaders were tenta-
tively carving out a public role for themselves as advocates of the Soviet peace
campaigns. These contradictions, which served to undermine both the peace rhet-
oric and the anti-religious campaigns, were to remain and deepen in the post-Stalin
years: the elderly (male) pastor sombrely sitting on the podium at the peace con-
gress was now joined in Soviet performative space by the dangerous, deluded, and
invariably female, fanatic.
One of the facets of de-Stalinization was the changing role of the press: ideological
controls were certainly not lifted, but there was more room for manoeuvre, and edi-
tors were expected to make their publications lively and engaging for the reader.116
Protestants now made it on to the pages of the Soviet press with greater regularity.
But they did so under two quite distinct guises. Toward the end of the decade, as a
new attack on religion gathered strength, the ‘sectarian’ became a particular focus of
attention, with a raft of sensationalist stories about her dangerous, uncontrolled
behaviour. At the same time, more sober pieces reported on international events at
which non-Orthodox Christians, particularly ECBs, appeared as trusted ambassadors
who embodied the tolerance and allegedly peaceful ambitions of the Soviet state. The
ambivalent position of the Protestant, which this article has traced back to the late
Stalinist period, now became readily visible to the attentive reader.
Pravda and Izvestiia reported on a number of international exchanges involving
Protestant leaders: on visits to the USSR by Baptists, Anglicans and Quakers; and
114 In the summer of 1959, a group of researchers took advantage of a new political climate favouring
the revival of sociological fieldwork and set off to Tambov region to study the current state of religious
sectarianism. In an article reporting on their findings, L.N. Mitrokhin expressed their surprise on
discovering that local Baptists spoke regularly of Christ’s imminent coming and Judgement Day, elem-
ents which he did not consider ‘characteristic’ of the church’s teaching. L.N. Mitrokhin, ‘Izuchenie
sektantsva v Tambovskoi oblasti’, Voprosy filosofii, 1 (January 1960), 143–8.
115 Over the course of the 1950s, unregistered groups of Pentecostals began to meet more frequently.
A small number of ‘Pure Baptists’ (chistye Baptisty) who practised the re-baptism of Evangelical
Christians also began to meet separately. But the most significant split occurred in 1961 with the
formation of the ‘Initiative Group’ under the leadership of G.K. Kriuchkov and A.F. Prokof’ev. In
August 1961, in their first ‘message’ to the evangelical community, Kriuchkov and Prokof’ev claimed
the documents approved by the AUCECB were ‘Satanic regulations’ which would bring about the
‘spiritual disintegration of the church’. See T.K. Nikol’skaia Russkii protestantizm i gosudarstvennaia
vlast’ (Saint Petersburg 2009), 201–15.
116 S. Huxtable, ‘A Compass in the Sea of Life: Soviet Journalism, the Public, and the Limits of
Reform after Stalin, 1953–1968’, unpublished thesis, University of London (2013); T.C. Wolfe,
Governing Soviet journalism: the press and the socialist person after Stalin (Bloomington, IL 2005).
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on visits by leaders of the AUCECB to the USA and Sweden.117 A number of press
articles followed celebrating their participation in the peace campaigns: in 1956, an
article acknowledged the speech given by A.V. Karev when the Stalin Peace Prize
was awarded to a Norwegian pastor;118 in 1957 the AUCECB sent an ‘appeal’ to the
Berlin Congress of Peace commending the importance of Christian love;119 in 1959
Karev himself was one of ﬁve Soviet public ﬁgures awarded a medal by the WPC for
their peace work.120 Zhidkov and Karev were frequent signatories on petitions call-
ing for nuclear disarmament and articles alerting the world to the threat of atomic
bombs.121 In these pieces, AUCECB leaders were regularly included in lists of advo-
cates for peace, lined up alongside other religious leaders: the ecumenical movement
Polianskii had advocated in 1947 seemed to have become a discursive reality. Yet
CARC oﬃcials were themselves unhappy with what had been achieved.
In 1956, CARC leaders reviewed progress so far in a memo addressed to the
Central Committee’s Department of Propaganda and Agitation. In this major
report, CARC began by noting that since its inception the Council had been
able to ensure that religious organizations, not just the ROC, developed a patriotic
relationship with the Soviet state. The authors stressed the thriving ecumenical
movement in the West, citing the work of the WCC in particular, and presented
the participation of various Soviet religious leaders in the peace campaigns as a
very important counterweight. But in order for their potential to be exploited,
CARC maintained, greater coherence between international and domestic policy
was needed, particularly given that foreigners were increasingly interested in the
nature of religious freedom ‘behind the iron curtain’. The memo’s main thrust was
thus to call for an end to miscarriages of justice committed towards believers and
for the constitution to be respected.122 As the rich historiography on the anti-
religious campaigns of the Khrushchev era establishes, this was not at all what
117 ‘Priezd iz Moskvy rukovodiashchikh deiatelei baptistskoi tserkvi’, Izvestiia (19 June 1954), 4;
‘Deiateli Vsemirnogo soiuza baptistov o svoei poezdke po Sovetskoi strane’, Izvestiia (2 July 1954),
4; ‘Ot’’ezd delegatsii baptistov v Shvetsiiu’, Izvestiia (3 August 1954), 4; ‘Vozvrashchenie delegatsii
baptitskoi tserkvi iz Shvetsii’, Izvestiia (16 August 1953), 4; ‘Beseda s predsedatelem Vsesoiuznogo
soveta evangel’skikh khristian-baptistov Iakovom Zhidkovym’, Izvestiia (22 August 1954), 4; ‘Priezd
v SSSR rukovoditelei amerikanskikh baptistov’, Izvestiia (7 August 1955), 4; ‘Priezd v Moskvu dele-
gatsii Soiuza shvedskikh baptistov’, Izvestiia (31 March 1956), 4: ‘Prebyvanie v SSSR delegatsii Soiuza
shvedskikh baptistov’, Pravda (31 March 1956), 4; ‘Ot’’ezd na rodinu delegatsii shvedskikh baptistov’,
Izvestiia (6 April 1956), 4; ‘Ot’’ezd v SShA delegatsii baptistskoi tserkvi’, Izvestiia (18 May 1956), 4;
‘Pribytie v SShA delegatsii baptistov SSSR’, Izvestiia (20 May 1956); ‘Vozvrashchenie v Moskvu dele-
gatsii baptistskoi tserkvi’, Izvestiia (28 June 1956), 4.
118 ‘Vruchenie mezhdunarodnoy Staliniskoi premii norvezhskomu obshchestvennomu deiateliu pas-
toru Ragnaru Forbekku’, Pravda (21 March 1956), 1.
119 ‘Zaiavlenie Vsesoiuznogo Soveta evangel’skikh khristian-baptistov o Berlinskom Vozzvanii
Vsemirnogo Soveta Mira’, Izvestiia (28 June 1957), 4.
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December 1959), 3.
121 ‘Tserkovnye deiateli Chekhoslovakii i SSSR trebuiut osvobozhdeniia chelovechestva ot strakha
atomnoy voiny’, Izvestiia 7 December 1958), 6; ‘Reshit’ problemu prekrashcheniia iadernykh ispytanii’,
Pravda (22 January 1959), 6; ‘Predotvratit’ ugrozu atomnoy voiny. Pis’mo sovetskikh obshchestvennykh
deiatelei organizatoram Evropeiskogo Kongressa za iadernoe razoruzhenie’, Pravda (15 February 1959), 6.
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happened, of course: by the end of the decade, the number of church closures and
arrests had spiralled.123 The use of propaganda to demonize the sectarian in fact
meant such abuses were hardly a secret, either for the Soviet or the international
public. In the media, stories of child sacriﬁce conducted by ‘sectarians’ were per-
haps the most extreme manifestation of this demonizing tendency.124 Other charges
were laid against ‘sectarians’ in the press: they endangered proselytes’ physical and
mental health, sometimes resulting in suicide;125 they committed criminal acts such
as fraud;126 and, of course, they predicted the end of the world.127 This viliﬁcation
of the sectarian is reﬂected in the fact that Protestants, given the relatively small
size of the community overall, again constituted a disproportionate percentage of
arrests: between 1961 and 1964, 640 convictions had been made on religious
grounds in Russia, of which 260 concerned Pentecostals or ECBs; in Ukraine in
the same period, of 324 religious arrests, 167 were Pentecostal or ECB.128
Let us consider a ﬁnal court-case which shows how the public demonization of
believers that became so ubiquitous in the Khrushchev period also drew on, and
ampliﬁed, ideas re-discovered in the late Stalinist era, in particular the concept of
the sectarian as a paciﬁst and dangerous prophet of the apocalypse. In December
1956 two men, both of German ethnicity, were convicted of anti-Soviet agitation
and propaganda by Semipalatinsk regional court (Kazakhstan). Both collective
farmers in their thirties, Ia. Betram and A. Gotman were identiﬁed as leaders of
the Soviet religious group ‘Children of God’, but Gotman had been a member of a
Baptist congregation for a number of years. The men were accused of spreading
anti-Soviet propaganda. According to the court records, they burnt their army
cards, vociferously condemned military service, destroyed their own property,
killed their dogs, stopped their children attending school, and called on others to
do the same.129 A summary of court proceedings suggested that Gotman explained
his actions in terms of prophecy (prorochestvo) particularly with regard to the
imminent end: he was told believers would be led to Israel, and their belongings
123 On the anti-religious initiatives of the Khrushchev era, see for example A.B. Stone, ‘Overcoming
Peasant Backwardness: The Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union’, Russian
Review, 67, 2 (April 2008), 296–320; I. Paert, ‘Demystifying the Heavens: Women, Religion and
Khrushchev’s Anti-religious Campaign, 1954–1964’, in S.E. Reid, M. Ilicˇ and L. Attwood (eds),
Women in the Khrushchev Era (Basingstoke 2004), 203–21; Chumachenko, Church and State;
Shkarovskii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’; E. Zhidkova, ‘Antireligioznaia kampaniia vremen
‘‘ottepeli’’ v Kuibyshevskoi oblasti’, Neprikosnovennyi zapas, 59, 3 (2008), 108–19; V. Smolkin-
Rothrock, ‘Cosmic Enlightenment: Scientific Atheism and the Soviet Conquest of Space’, in J.T.
Andrews and A.A. Siddiqi (eds), Into the Cosmos: Space Exploration and Soviet Culture (Pittsburgh,
PA 2011), 159–94.
124 M. Dobson, ‘Child Sacrifice in the Soviet Press: Sensationalism and the ‘Sectarian’ in the Post-
Stalin Era’, Russian Review, 73, 2 (April 2014), 237–59.
125 V. Mishin, ‘‘‘Ottsy i deti’ piatidesiatnikov’, Nauka i religiia, 5 (May 1960), 27–30; S. Morozov,
‘Zhivoe i mertvoe’, Izvestiia (18 June 1961), 6; N. Shtan’ko, ‘Za plotno zanaveshennym oknom’,
Izvestiia (19 June 1962), 6.
126 ‘Neprimirimost’’, Pravda (16 August 1960), 2.
127 G. Mikhailov, ‘V chem vred baptisma’, Sovetskaia Kirgiziia (5 November 1958).
128 GARF f. 6991, op. 4, d. 173, l. 180.
129 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 78492, ll. 2–12.
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should not be left behind for their enemies (non-believers).130 For the whole of
November and December 1956, it was claimed, 26 villagers refused to go to work
on the farm because they were preparing for the end of the world.131 If true, this
would suggest that the fears were not unique to the two leaders.
In contrast to the court cases of the late Stalinist era, this trial was reported in
the national press. In 1957 an article in Komsomol’skaia pravda explained how the
‘Children of God’ held conversations with the almighty which ended in ‘contorted
dancing and grimacing’, engaged in sexual depravity (such as wife-sharing), and
spread rumours that the end of the world was imminent (the charge which was the
centre of the court case). But this was not all: the piece also graphically describes
how young communists, upon hearing cries and disturbance, hurried to Betram’s
home, ‘ﬂung open the door and saw a wild sight – a young, half-naked woman was
standing beside a tall white cross . . .The monsters planned to nail the young
woman to the cross’.132 A ﬂeeting reference to this unlikely occurrence was made
in a witness statement in the court record but was key to the press version which
depicted the believers as debauched fanatics, drawing on pre-revolutionary notions
of the sectarian’s depravity.133 The article also made clear that such monstrous
behaviour resulted from their hysteria about the End Times. Perhaps geography
played its part: the collective farm where this incident occurred was close to the
town of Borodulikha in eastern Kazakhstan, and in relative proximity to the
Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.134 No reference was made to this in the court ﬁle
or newspaper coverage, but it is worth speculating whether there was a connection
between locals’ belief that the end was coming and the huge ﬁreballs, mushroom
clouds, deafening roars, and earthquake-like tremors they must have witnessed.
At least in part a product of the early Cold War, the anxiety surrounding reli-
gious subcultures, particularly their potential to spread apocalyptic fear, now coa-
lesced into a terrifying and much-publicized spectre: the ‘sectarian’ was no longer a
problem over which party and state oﬃcials shook their heads in the hush of
governmental oﬃces, or passed sentence in a closed courtroom, as had been the
case in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but a folk devil repeatedly reviled in the
press, newsreels and feature ﬁlms. And yet this image of the fanatic was rivalled by
that of ‘sectarian’ leaders taking to the international stage. In 1960, at the peak of
Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign, one tract noted: ‘There is no doubt that the
struggle for peace would be even more successful if it was freed from its religious
130 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 78492, l. 6.
131 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 78492, l. 2.
132 ‘From the Courtroom: Children of God’, Komsomol’skaia Pravda (28 April 1957), 4.
133 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 78492, l. 17. Sensationalist scenes of Pentecostals attempting to crucify a
young girl provided the dramatic finale to a popular anti-religious film of the era, Tuchi nad Borskom,
dir. Vasilii Ordynskii (Moscow 1960). On this, see A.A. Panchenko, ‘‘‘Triasuny’’: Distsiplinarnoe
obshchestvo, politicheskaia politsiia i sud’by piatidesiatnichestva v Rossii’, Antropologicheskii forum,
18 (2013), 223–55.
134 D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven,
CT and London 1994), 323. For personal accounts of witnessing the explosions see J. Lernager, ‘Second
Sunset – Victims of Soviet Nuclear Testing’, Sierra (March–April 1992).
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covering [obolochka] as religion only prevents people from recognizing and expos-
ing enemies of peace’.135 Quite an admission for a piece of Soviet propaganda. Still,
this contradictory approach continued into the early 1960s, with Zhidkov
among the signatories of an ecumenical peace appeal published in Izvestiia
during the Cuban Crisis of 1962 – the year with the highest levels of anti-religious
propaganda.136
In the USA, the late 1940s and 1950s saw religion, broadly conceived, provide a
common ground for politicians, business leaders, and ordinary people, many of
whom came to believe that their country’s position in the Cold War was divinely
sanctioned. Some thought that nuclear weapons might be a sign of the Second
Coming, conferring on the conﬂict additional intensity and purpose. Given the
atheist foundations of the communist regime, religion could hardly create this
kind of convergence of interests in the USSR. And yet the term ‘religious cold
war’ is nonetheless suggestive in the Soviet context, even if it allows us to identify
points of tension rather than a story of (prospective) national unity as was the case
in the USA.
In the USSR, religious activity had increased during the war. In its aftermath,
the threat of a new outbreak of violence (with weapons about which citizens were
given ominous but unclear warnings), created intense anxiety, and religious con-
cepts and imagery proved one way to articulate these fears, just as they did in the
USA. Instead of encouraging, or at least tolerating, apocalyptic thinking, the
Soviet state tried to suppress the religious imagination, dismissing it as the realm
only of a sectarian, lunatic fringe. This demonization of the ‘sectarian’ made itself
fully felt with the anti-religious campaigns of the Khrushchev era, but its roots date
back to mid-1947 and the start of the Cold War. Yet the Soviet state did not limit
itself to this tactic. The party leadership did not straight-forwardly denounce reli-
gion and its adherents, even though this would have been in keeping with the
atheist doctrines which the regime had fought so hard to instil in its population.137
Nor did it simply embrace Russian Orthodoxy as a source of nationalist sentiment,
as is often assumed. It felt drawn to participate in the ‘religious cold war’ launched
by the USA under Truman’s presidency and sought to create its own ecumenical
movement, attempting to prove its tolerance towards diﬀerent faiths and the uni-
versal appeal of its peace message.
135 Tsvetogorov, Sektanty, 63.
136 For the 1962 appeal, see ‘Obrashchenie glav tserkvei i religioznykh ob’’edinenii sovetskogo soiuza
k glavam vsekh pravitel’stv mira, k predstoiateliam vsekh khristianskikh tserkvei, k khristianam vsego
mira’, Izvestiia (25 October 1962).
137 On the earlier period, see in particular D. Peris, Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the
Militant Godless (Ithaca NY 1998); on the late Soviet era, see V. Smolkin, ‘‘‘Sviato mesto pusto ne
byvaet’: Ateisticheskoe vospitanie v Sovetskom Soiuze, 1964–1968’’, Neprikosnovennyi zapas, 65, 3
(2009), at magazines.russ.ru/nz/2009/3/sm5.html (last accessed 16 October 2014) and V. Smolkin-
Rothrock, ‘The Ticket to the Soviet Soul: Science, Religion, and the Spiritual Crisis of Late Soviet
Atheism’, Russian Review, 73, 2 (April 2014), 171–97.
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‘Peace’ was presented as a patriotic cause, a shared commitment to building a
state of harmony on earth, and certainly some Christians – including ECB leaders –
were willing to endorse such a vision. And yet within the Christian tradition, and
cutting across the denominations, there was also a very diﬀerent conception of both
‘peace’ and the future: paciﬁst opposition to warfare; and a belief that paradise
must await the second coming (and further strife and devastation). As the Cold
War escalated, the authorities were fearful that dangerous and politicized inter-
pretations of scripture were on the rise. As a result, those identiﬁed as ‘sectarians’
were targeted for arrest in both the late Stalinist era and during Khrushchev’s
anti-religious campaigns. This persecution opened the regime up to easy charges
of hypocrisy by providing opponents both at home and abroad with ready ammu-
nition, as was noted in the major CARC report of 1956 and demonstrated by
Krylov’s ‘appeal’ two years later.
Although religion was an arena of the Cold War where the USA clearly had a
natural advantage, the Soviet government was unwilling to retreat.138 Throughout
the ﬁnal decades of its existence the Soviet regime continued to denounce religious
faith as both a tool used by imperialists to discipline their subjects and as a dan-
gerous source of irrational and unproductive thinking among its own population,
but it nonetheless sought to present itself, both domestically and internationally, as
an inclusive and law-bound polity, far more committed to defending freedom of
conscience than its capitalist adversaries. Religion thus took on a renewed prom-
inence in the USSR during the Cold War, but its treatment was more conﬂicted and
ambiguous than might be expected. The status of Protestantism embodies this
ambivalence particularly clearly: its believers were viliﬁed as subversive and unset-
tling ‘sectarians’, but its leaders were enlisted to join the chorus of patriotic
approval for the Soviet peace cause. A ‘religious cold war’ was thus waged on
both sides of the iron curtain, but to the east – instead of providing a sense of
shared mission as it did in the west – its internal contradictions undermined both
the regime’s long-standing atheist credentials and its more recent attempts to pre-
sent itself as humankind’s only hope for achieving peace and harmony in this
world.
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